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Wheeler-Dealing:
An Essay on Law, Politics, and Speech
ALLAN HUTCHINSON* and MELINDA JONES**
Few matters seem to arouse greater feeling than local politics and sport. Each
reflects and reinforces common qualities of robust partisanship and vigorous
exercise. When the two combine, tempers are guaranteed to run very high.
This unpropitious state of affairs occurred in Leicester in the spring of 1984.
The city of Leicester has a significant and established black community; about
twenty-five per cent of the population are of Asian or Afro-Caribbean origins.
Leicester City Council was firmly committed to racial equality. In particular,
it supported the Gleneagles Agreement made in 1977 between Common-
wealth countries which encouraged "taking every practical step to discourage
contact with sporting organisations from South Africa". When the English
rugby team organised a tour to South Africa and selected three Leicester
players, the council considered the gauntlet to be thrown firmly at its feet. The
council allowed the Leicester Rugby Football Club to use a recreation ground
for Second XV matches and general training; the First XV played elsewhere.
After much debate, Leicester City Council determined that, unless the club
officials were prepared to condemn the tour and urge its players not to play, it
would suspend the club's use of its recreation ground. The council fully
appreciated the club had no power to instruct its amateur players not to tour.
Although the club joined with the council in condemning apartheid, it felt that
a total prohibition of all sporting links with South Africa would enhance
rather than diminish apartheid. Consequently, the club refused to comply
with the council's request. After the tour had taken place the council banned
the club from using the recreation ground for twelve months. The club sought
an order of certiorari quashing this decision, a declaration that the council's
decision was ultra vires, and an injunction restraining the implementation of
the decision.
*Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto,
Canada.
**Lecturer in Law, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia.
This project began while Allan Hutchinson was a visitor at Monash University, Melbourne. The
authors appreciate the comments by friends at Osgoode Hall and Monash on an earlier draft.
As a matter of administrative law, the dispute was framed as one concerning
the legitimate exercise of power by a local authority. Was the ban ultra vires or
was the council within its statutorily-defined powers? The council contended
that, in exercising its discretionary power over its land, it had a duty under the
Race Relations Act 1976 "to make appropriate arrangements... to promote
... good relations between persons of different racial groups"; thus, the ban
was merely part of this statutorily-obligated policy. The club accepted that the
council did possess such authority, but argued that as the club's actions were
neither illegal nor unreasonable, the council was in breach of its accompany-
ing common law responsibility to exercise its statutory powers in a reasonable
manner.1 The council was attempting to punish the club for its refusal to
endorse the official view of Leicester City Council.
Anxious to emphasise thatjudicial review did not raise questions of political
judgement, the courts were at pains not to trespass:
... across that line which divides a proper exercise of a statutory discretion based on a
political judgment, in relation to which the courts must not and will not interfere, from an
improper exercise of such a discretion in relation to which the courts will interfere.
2
At first instance, Forbes J. held that, although Leicester City Council did
not have unfettered discretion in allocating its lands to competing public uses,
it was entitled to give weight to the need to promote good race relations. The
Court of Appeal upheld this decision and a majority of the judges went even
further. Ackner L.J. and Sir George Waller concluded that the council's
decision to ban the club was not so unreasonable that no reasonable council
could ever have made it. 3 The House of Lords allowed the club's appeal and
reversed the decision of the lower court.4 The law lords held that, while the
council was entitled to give weight to considerations of good race relations, the
council's ban was unreasonable in the Associated Provincial Picture Houses
Ltd. v Wednesbury Corporation sense of being unfair and procedurally
improper.
Although the "reasonableness" doctrine was originally confined to situations
where the decision-maker acted arbitrarily or capriciously, it has more
recently been used to overrule decisions which the courts consider politically
wrong.5 Wheeler and Others v Leicester City Council is such a case. It is
stretching things too far to claim that the council's decision is "so absurd that no
sensible person could ever dream that it laywithin the powers of the authority".
6
As presently conceived, the doctrine of "reasonableness" is an empty barrel into
which any political brew can be poured. Whereas Ackner L.J. and Sir George
Waller thought the council acted reasonably, Roskill and Templeman L.JJ.
thought it had not. Almost no indication was given as to why and by what lights
they reached these conclusions. The most egregious culprit is Roskill L.J. who
simply announced that while "I... greatly hesitate to differ from four learned
judges,. . . I... say that the actions of the council were unreasonable". 7 Such
conclusory statements do not pass argumentative muster; they fail to satisfy
even minimal standards for reasoned argument and decision-making.
Accordingly, it is the burden of this short essay to uncover and criticise the
arguments and assumptions on which the judgments rest. In so doing, our aim
is two-fold. First, the inevitable and inescapable political nature of the judicial
enterprise will be thoroughly revealed; there is no way to judge without
entering the ideological debate and struggle over how we should and should
not organise social life. Secondly, the controversial and contingent nature of
that debate and struggle will be demonstrated; there are no settled or final
resolutions. By examining the facts and judgments in Wheeler and Others v
Leicester City Council, the limits and affiliations of conventional legal
thinking will be laid bare for critical scrutiny.
For all its doctrinal imperfections, Wheeler and Others v Leicester City Council
does appear to be a victory for liberals and all those who place a high value on
freedom of speech. As Templeman L.J. reminds us, "the laws of this country
are not like the laws of Nazi Germany".8 Public authorities cannot insist that
people openly and enthusiastically commit themselves to views which they do
not hold. Nor can the state punish people for adhering to political opinions of
which the state does not approve. However, such a positive assessment of the
judgments misrepresents their major thrust. At best, the law lords' handling of
the free speech issue should be described as Orwellian. The rhetoric is certainly
in place, but the substantive message does more to undermine than to promote
confidence in the courts as the protector of civil liberties.
Despite his indignant and complacent tone, Templeman L.J. manages to
contradict and imperil a commitment to free speech. While freedom of speech
is enshrined as a fundamental and fragile value to be protected vigorously by
the courts, he asserts that "of course this does not mean that the council is
bound to allow its property to be used by a racist organisation". 9 As the club
and players had "a perfectly proper attitude, caught as they were in a political
controversy which was not of their making", 10 the council was not entitled to
reprimand them. Such a conditional and constrained protection of free speech
offers cold comfort. The real objection to the council's action was not that
account was taken of the political views of the applicants nor that they
improperly requested the applicants to publicly endorse their views. It was
that the views of the players were "politically sound". It was the antipathy
between racist sentiments and views about the links between politics and sport
which invalidated the council's decision. The fact that the individuals held
lawful views about apartheid and were "right thinking people" suggested to
the judges that they should be entitled to their own opinions. On this
reasoning, civil liberties are co-extensive with - but no broader than - the
extant attitudes and beliefs of the judicial establishment. This offers a
frightening prospect; social justice is still very much dependent on the size of
the Lord Chancellor's conservative foot.
The only exception to this lamentable state of affairs was the dissenting
judgment of Browne-Wilkinson L.J. which was expressly rejected by the
House of Lords. For him, the case raised fundamental difficulties about
reconciling two conflicting principles of a democratic society:
... on the one hand, the right of a democratically elected body to conduct its affairs in
accordance with its own views and, on the other, the right to freedom of speech and
conscience enjoyed by each individual in a democratic society. I
Although he acknowledged the council's duty under the 1976 legislation to
establish good race relations, he maintained that it had to be read against
fundamental constitutional rights of individual freedom which impliedly
constrained the exercise of statutory powers unless expressly abrogated by
Parliament.I2 Freedom of speech entails a liberty to refrain from and not be
punished for expressing views that run contrary to those held by public
authorities:
The right to freedom of speech depends on the fact that no one has the right to stop the
individual expressing his own views, save to the extent that those views are libellous or
seditious. These fundamental freedoms therefore are not positive rights but an immunity
from interference by others. Accordingly, I do not consider that general words in an
Act of Parliament can be taken as authorising interference with these basic immunities
which are the foundation of our freedom. . . . [When Parliament confers general
discretionaiy powers on public authorities it cannot in general be taken to have
contemplated that such discretions can be exercised by taking into account lawful views of
those affected by the exercise of the discretions or their willingness to express certain
views. I 3
Browne-Wilkinson gives voice to the concerns of civil libertarians and
demonstrates a willingness and courage to face squarely the competing
freedoms that energise the dispute and its political tension. However, he
might have jumped out of the legal frying pan and into the political fire.
Academic comment that hails Browne-Wilkinson's judgment as "enlightening
and enlightened" 14 is premature. This is truly a hard case. The difficulty
is not Dworkin's esoteric problem of establishing that a matter of principle
is involved, but one which goes to the very heart of democratic theory and
practice. It highlights the contradictions and confusions of much traditional
thinking and its impoverished premises. When stripped of its rhetorical
appeal to constitutionalism, the rule of law, and free speech, Browne-
Wilkinson's judgment has ambiguous merit. As a component of a larger
scheme of legal doctrine, his judicial musings reflect and reinforce a particular
and limited vision of social relations and thinking. The issues raised in
Wheeler and Others v Leicester City Council are extremely complex and
deserve a more thorough-going treatment than that provided by the courts.
This is not a case that can be resolved simply by paying lip-service to
general principles and vague commitments. Even if statutory provisions
are to be construed in terms of free speech, it is not at all clear that
the rugby ban was in breach of that principle. The judgments and the political/
legal theory that they tacitly invoke are shot through with false analogies,
hidden assumptions, and leaps of ideological faith. They collapse a number
of issues into one and, as such, distort the overall picture. While the response
to each issue might independently amount to a plausible or acceptable
position, their combination fails: the principle of free speech is no Ockham's
Razor.
"Free speech" is an evocative and potent term. As an ideal, like due process
and natural justice, it exercises a tenacious grip on the political imagination
and consciousness. Yet its ideological attraction and resilience are largely
attributable to its historical adaptability and political plasticity. Free speech
only takes on meaning and substance in particular contexts. Its content is fixed
by those values it is chosen or seen to protect and promote at any particular
time. The two major justifications - liberal and democratic - for freedom of
speech can be distinguished by the different limitations they suggest on the
authority and power of the state to intervene in speech matters.1 5 Liberals
want individuals left alone to cultivate their own personalities through diverse
acts of self-expression. Government must be scrupulous not to interfere with
this inherent right to self-fulfillment even if its exercise is inimical to the public
interest. The state is only obliged to intervene when there is a real and not
imagined clear and present danger of quantitative and qualitative harm to
another; merely upsetting, insulting, or disgusting another is insufficient as
this is an inevitable corollary of speech. On the other hand, democrats protect
political speech so that people can engage in informed public debate and effect
a substantial degree of self-governance. Government must facilitate the
expression and hearing of a full spectrum of values and ideas at large in
society. However, the democrat is less concerned with the protection of so-
called obscene, blasphemous, or other undesirable speech. If the touchstone of
the liberal justification is self-realisation and distrust of the state, the
touchstone of the democratic justification is political knowledge and the
ennobling value of speech.
Before exploring their likely response to Wheeler and Others v Leicester City
Council, the limitations and weaknesses of these justifications ought to be
mentioned. First, there is the problem of the primacy of the value of speech
within each ethical structure. The problem for the liberal is to explain why
speech is special. She or he must explain why speech is of greater significance
and in need of greater protection than prior needs such as food and shelter -
rights which liberals have been slow to champion. 16 The parallel problem for
the democrat is to explain how majoritarian principles ought to be set aside in
the interest of the minority. If the majority holds a legitimate and informed
view, the democratic perspective suggests that dissenting individual voices can
have no claim to be heard. In addition, there is the indeterminacy of these
justifications. Although they each have a different substantive tilt, with the
liberals favouring freedom over equality and the democrats equality over
freedom, they can both be used to justify conflicting solutions. Indeed, each
relies on the implicit values of the other to avoid the injustice that accrues from
an unmitigated reliance on one to the complete exclusion of the other.1 7
Although these justifications push in different directions and place different
weights on the scales ofjustice, both liberals and democrats accept that which
is fundamentally objectionable and to be prohibited is the prevention of
speech. However, in Wheeler and Others v Leicester City Council, no-one was
prevented from speaking. Instead, the rugby players were asked to speak.
This raises the issue of whether freedom of speech incorporates the cor-
responding right not to speak. Despite the tendency to treat silence as a
unidimensional circumstance, it is a subtle and complex mode of human
action. As Thomas Carlyle stated, "Silence is Deep as Eternity; speech is as
shallow as Time." 18 The response of the courts to the constitutional status of
silence is characteristically mixed. Despite the soaring rhetoric, the law and
legal theorists have combined to weave a patchwork quilt of doctrine and
defences.
The democrat may well answer differently to the liberal on a right to silence.
The democrat would have no principled objection to state-enforced require-
ments that people and institutions provide information to those who request
it. Indeed, the need to facilitate effective government by citizens might actually
place an affirmative duty on the state to ensure that adequate knowledge and
information is made publicly available. Such thinking has supported legisla-
tion to allow access to government information, census taking, the disclosure
of corporate dealings, compellability of trial witnesses, regulation of advert-
ising, disclosure of private affairs by elected officials, and much more. In a
similar vein, the courts have refused to grant to the media a testimonial
privilege to withhold its confidential sources of information. 19 Being more
concerned with the sanctity of the individual, the liberal will clearly object to
the state requiring any sort of declaration of individuals. If there is no
possibility that remaining silent will harm another, it will be treated as a self-
regarding action beyond the legitimate sphere of government action. How-
ever, if silence could result in harm to others, it is other-regarding and speech
can be demanded. Although there is much dissension in their ranks, modern
information-seeking legislation is capable of liberal justification on such
grounds. 20 Liberals and democrats would also raise the important distinction
between obliging people to divulge information and requiring them to endorse
opinions that they do not hold.
In Wheeler and Others v Leicester City Council it was not that the
rugby players were required to speak, but that the council's threat was
intended to force the players to express a political opinion that they did
not hold or else be punished. As such, it offends a "fixed star in [the]
constitutional constellation" which insists that "no official ... can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics.., or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein."2 Although this unimpeachable sentiment seems to
dispense with the council's action and justify the court's finding in Wheeler and
Others v Leicester City Council, it hides much of complexity and difficulty
under its sweeping injunction. For instance, liberals and democrats alike must
be able to distinguish between facts and information which people can be
legitimately obliged to speak, and ideas and opinions which cannot be
legitimately forced into people's mouths. Not only have attempts to make
meaningful distinctions between different kinds of speech been less than
encouraging in the United States of America, 2 2 but the law has struggled
generally to separate truth from falsity and belief from knowledge. The
development of defamation law as applied to the media is a good illustration
of the problems.
In Wheeler and Others v Leicester City Council the problem of the right to
remain silent arose because of the rugby club's refusal to endorse the council's
anti-apartheid policy. Can a public body require that users of its property
display the warning that racism is anti-social? Is this any different from
requiring cigarette producers to print the warning that "smoking is a health
hazard"? Is it relevant, in either case, that the speaker neither believes in the
truth of the warning nor cares about the message? In either case, the speakers
are mainly concerned with the business of making money and playing ball.
The council's strategy for hastening the demise of apartheid could be seen to
be remitliscent of the loyalty oaths which were used to great political effect in
the United States of America in the 1950s and 1960s. In these instances liberals
and democrats alike insisted that free speech must protect the right to remain
silent. Public employment and the enjoyment of public benefits (including the
benefits of the National Labour Relations Act) were predicated upon the
swearing of an oath; speakers had to declare that they were not communists
and did not believe in the overthrow of the government by force or by other
illegal means. This was a clear and virulent attempt to deny all civil liberties to
communists and other "subversives". Judicial declarations of unconstitu-
tionality did little to deter public authorities who simply changed their tack.
2 3
Individuals were obliged to swear simple oaths of affirmation, stating that
theywould uphold the federal and state constitutions. If it could be shown that
speakers belonged to an organisation committed to communism or the
transformation of the state, they were punished for perjury. In time, the court
and most commentators considered that such methods were intimidatory and
inimical to free speech.
But these cases are very different from Wheeler and Others v Leicester City
Council. While it is difficult to imagine any justification for the state's action in
the loyalty oath cases that would satisfy a self-respecting liberal or democrat,
the circumstances in Wheeler and Others v Leicester City Council were very
different. It is true that, as in the loyalty oath cases, the opinion of the
club members was being stigmatised. But the attempt to eliminate the
"undesirable" idea was qualitatively different from that aimed at in the loyalty
oath cases. In Wheeler and Others v Leicester City Council the council was
attempting to suppress a popular idea that itself undermined the sanctity of
the individual. Moreover, whereas people's livelihoods were threatened in the
United States of America, Wheeler and Others v Leicester City Council
involved the use of public open space for playing rugby on some ten occasions
during the year; there were plenty of other grounds available. It was more of
an inconvenience than a serious deprivation and - relative to the effect on the
black community of Leicester - was quite trivial. Further, in Wheeler and
Others v Leicester City Council there was no attempt to ititimidate the
individuals concerned, although there certainly was a desire to punish them;
disagreement was over strategy and not purpose. What is perhaps most
important in distinguishing Wheeler and Others v Leicester City Council from
the loyalty oath cases is the fact that the decision was not intended to have a
chilling effect on ideas or speech. It was, instead, intended to allow the council
to make a statement through a body which was seen as an ambassador for the
community. In such a case it is extremely uncertain that the free speech
principle must or should be extended to protect the rugby players' desire to
remain silent.
III
The court in Wheeler and Others v Leicester City Council avoided the question
as to whether anyone's speech rights had actually been transgressed. It simply
assumed that the right to free speech endorsed and protected the desire of an
individual to remain silent. In fact, the court decided the case by reference to
those principles governing access to public property. Although there is no
right in the law of England and Wales to hold a public meeting, 24 it is accepted
that, in determining whether public facilities can be used for speech purposes,
the authorities are not entitled to grant or withhold permission on the basis of
the views likely to be expressed. For instance, in Verral v Great Yarmouth
Borough Council2 I a council sought to revoke a contract made by the previous
administration with the National Front (a fascist organisation) and prevent it
from using a public hall for their meetings. The Court of Appeal held that the
contract was enforceable as "the right to speak should not be denied, even to
those who speak . . . obnoxiously and offensively". 26 Clearly, Wheeler and
Others v Leicester City Council is very different. The council did not prevent
the club from speaking. Indeed, the council could have quite consistently
allowed the club full and uninhibited access to council facilities to argue and
communicate the club's opinion.
Nevertheless, it might be thought that the club could bring its claim within
the Verral v Great Yarmouth Borough Council principle by arguing that the
playing of rugby - at least in the particular circumstances of the case -
amounts to an act of speech. Although its scope is a matter of dispute, it is
uncontroversial that the guarantee of free speech can stretch beyond
conventional kinds of speech to include symbolic forms of communication.
However, while it is entirely appropriate to treat draft-card burning, flag
saluting, arm-band wearing, and picketing in certain contexts as speech, 27 it is
difficult to understand how the playing of rugby could be reasonably said to
amount to any particular statement about racism. The fact that it might be
interpreted by some as a vague act of defiance is insufficient on its own to
warrant protection. Mindful of the fact that "all behaviour is capable of being
understood as communication", 28 the acceptance of such arguments would
mean that any criminal act of caprice would be portrayed as a committed and
principled challenge to the regime of private property. Moreover, even with
regard to the fundamental nature of free speech, Wheeler and Others v
Leicester City Council should be distinguished from Verral v Great Yarmouth
Borough Council. The fact that rugby players wished to express a popular view
which, through the auspices of the Rugby Football Union, had widespread
communal acceptance, clearly separates Wheeler and Others v Leicester City
Council from the majority of cases dealing with freedom of speech.
A commitment to freedom of speech, whether from the moral imperative of
liberalism or from the functional perspective of the democrat, is intended to
ensure that minority positions are given an airing in the face of a powerful
majority. But in Wheeler and Others v Leicester City Council it was the council
which was attempting to assert the position of the racial minorities whom it
represented, against the view of a powerful non-state body. It is a naive view of
democracy which translates the position of a minority into the mainstream
simply by virtue of that minority finding an official voice. This situation is
troubling and revealing for liberals and democrats. While it is unproblematic
to translate the position of the rugby club into the rights of players, it is
extremely difficult to accommodate similarly the position of the community.
Yet, it would seem that local government bodies, like individuals or
companies, often wish to make political statements which do not align them
with the mainstream of the society. A pluralist notion of society would be able
to recognise that in a complex constitutional system governments are as often
participants as they are umpires in political struggle. It seems that the council
should have a recognised speech-interest, such that it be accorded the right to
have its view about racism or nuclear war heard. If this were possible, and if it
were necessary to balance the competing speech-interests of the council and
the players, a different set of questions would be required. Who is wishing to
express the unpopular view? Is either body failing to accommodate any rights
of the other? Is the council using its position of power to discriminate or
unfairly disadvantage the other? By posing different questions, different
answers might be forthcoming.
Leicester City Council clearly made a mistake in their attempt to
disassociate themselves from supporters of apartheid. Had the council simply
decided to let another team use the rugby ground or to close the ground at the
relevant time, its decision would have been unassailable in the courts. The
rugby players had no right to use the ground or to have their licence renewed.
Further, imagine that instead of one club desiring to use the rugby field there
had been three or four clubs vying for its use. The council policy with regard to
racism, authorised by the Race Relations Act 1976, would certainly have
allowed the council to take account of the views of the rugby club - racist or
otherwise - in their decision about the allocation of public facilities. The real
objection to the council's action was not that account was taken of the
political views of the applicants or even that they improperly requested the
applicants to endorse publicly their views. In the court's assessment, the views
of the players were "politically sound". 29 Under the free speech principle, all
views are supposed to be legitimate and deserving of legal protection.
Accordingly, Wheeler and Others v Leicester City Council is not the landmark
for free speech that it pretends to be.
Rather than thinking in terms of free speech, the council was more
concerned to enhance racial equality; it considered equality more important
than liberty in the struggle for improved social justice. Of course, there is no
neutral or objective way to fix the relative ordering of equality and liberty.
However, a different cluster of considerations arise if Wheeler and Others v
Leicester City Council is treated as primarily a case about equality and race
relations rather than about liberty and freedom of speech. Importantly, there is
no longer any need to construe the council's action as an exercise of power which
undermines the rule of law. The whole incident ceases to be an instance when the
state's action has exposed or failed to protect innocent minoritarian individuals
from the unbridled force of majoritarian rule. In fact, Wheeler and Others v
Leicester City Council is exactly the opposite case. The difficulties arose
because of a firm commitment to the protection of minorities. A practical
consequence of this policy was to confront and vanquish a disaffected member
of the majority. In essence, Wheeler and Others v Leicester City Council
brought into sharp focus a deep and enduring disagreement between two
competing conceptions of social justice. It pitted the council's espousal of an
egalitarian justification against the courts' adherence to a libertarian ethic.
The council's preference for equality is, of course, far from radical or novel.
Concomitant with a commitment to freedom of speech, many countries have
enacted proscriptions against incitement to racial hatred. In the United
Kingdom the Labour Party first moved to ban incitement to racial hatred with
the Race Relations Act 1965. While it is clear that legislative desire to prevent
racism is no panacea, it is at least a public declaration of the political value of
equality and its priority over liberty. Moreover, in the celebrated case of Jordan
v Burgoyne,30 the courts did not consider that an individual had the liberty to tell
a crowd that Hitler had the right idea about the Jewish people or to provoke and
belittle individuals on the basis of race or belief. That was much more clearly a
free speech case than Wheeler and Others v Leicester City Council and the court
did not feel it appropriate to give priority to liberty. In this sense, therefore, the
courts in Wheeler and Others v Leicester City Council were not obliged by
judicial precedent or legislative wisdom to reach the decision they did.
By countenancing incitement to racial hatred, the courts do not abandon people
to majoritarian tyranny. What they do is opt for an egalitarian vision of social
justice over a libertarian one. By allowing for policies which encourage racial
harmony, the courts do not forsake the rule of law. What they do is support a
more progressive rendering of the judicial role than a traditional one. In either
case, the courts must take a political stand. It is not that they enter the debate
over equality and liberty; there is no way not to be part of that debate. The only
choices available are those of candour or subterfuge. In Wheeler and Others v
Leicester City Council the courts chose liberty over equality and subterfuge over
candour; the council chose equality over liberty and candour over subterfuge.
IV
Although the courts' commitment to free speech will hearten those who
support efforts to read a Bill of Rights into the common law, such constitutional
guarantees are a two-edged sword. The history of the use of freedom of speech
does not bear out the idea that when courts rely on that doctrine they are
acting in the cause of social justice. 3 1 A decision in favour of free speech is not
unequivocal support for individual freedom or democratic values. It favours
some interests at the expense of others; there is no escape from the burden of
substantive choice. Moreover, the courts engage so thoroughly in the process
of making, refining, reworking, collapsing, and rejecting doctrinal categories
that judges tend to lose sight of the very values that they are dealing with.
And when, as in this case, the judges make simplistic decisions resounding
with principle, they fail to recognise the working complexities of the values
they claim to acknowledge; sceptical caution is preferable to principled
smugness.
For all their apparent dissimilarity, the liberal and democratic justifications
of free speech share and form part of a common political philosophy of
individualism -a thing or state of affairs is only estimable if it is valuable to a
particular individual. The liberal's commitment is open and obvious. While
the democrats manage to obscure their dependency, they are equally wedded
to an individualistic ethic. Their concentration on the opportunities for
engaged deliberation is premised on the democratic process as a favoured
means for enhancing the more basic end of self-realisation through political
participation. The value of entering civil society is found in the medium of law
and its capacity to impose constraints on the power of Leviathan. In the
picture provided by John Stuart Mill and accepted by modern liberals, the
state must not interfere in matters of a private nature and ought to protect the
negative liberties of its citizens.3 2 It is this understanding that drives and
undergirds the approach of Browne-Wilkinson L.J. in Wheeler and Others v
Leicester City Council: "fundamental freedoms [like the right to freedom of
speech] . . . are not positive rights but an immunity from interference by
others."
33
As soon as liberals move beyond a libertarian free-market image of society
and recognise a legitimate role for the state, they become trapped by the need
to mediate between the state as a threat to freedom and the state as its
guarantor.34 In the realm of freedom of speech, this is particularly problem-
atic. For speech and language are not neutral activities, but are intrinsically
tied to social contexts. By focusing on individuals, liberal-democratic theory is
unable to deal with the complexities of the modern marketplace and the
impact of media control, corporate activity, and collective modes of individual
enterprise. The dominant theories fail to recognise that not all speakers are
equal but that some are more equal than others. The mask of neutrality hides
the unsightly face of sectarian politics.
At the heart of the problem is the crucial distinction between the public and
private spheres of social life. The courts imagine a Blackstonian set of natural
rights that must be protected and preserved. An abuse of power occurs when
the state, or someone acting through or on behalf of the state, interferes with
or fails to protect such entitlements. However, not only is such a vital
distinction between public and private acting impossible to make in any
meaningful, consistent, or predictable way, but also its arbitrary definition
and use have worked to benefit some interests at the expense of others.
Inaction or a decision not to intervene is as much governmental responsibility
as an active decision to do so. Efforts to preserve the status quo involve the
state as much as attempts to change it. Acquiescence and action are merely
flip-sides of the governmental coin. The protection of private property and the
enforcement of private contracts by the state ensures that a governmental
presence is strong and essential in private transactions. 3 1 It is never a matter of
whether the state should act, but exactly when and how it should regulate
social life.
Constitutional law in the United States of America is riven by a confusion
borne of an ill-fated reliance on the public/private distinction. 36 In the law of
England and Wales a similar process of reasoning and state of confusion are
apparent, although less pronounced; overt occasions for constitutional
adjudication are much fewer. A pertinent illustration is the courts' inter-
pretation of the Race Relations Act 1968 in Race Relations Board v Charter. A
fundamental issue was the precise meaning of the Act's limitation to "the
public or sector of the public". The House of Lords engaged in a highly
formalistic analysis of the statutory words and resolved that a social club was
private and could discriminate at will; the judgments are remarkable for their
lack of any functional consideration of the issue. 3 7 However, in Race
Relations Board v Applin the law lords held that efforts to dissuade couples
from fostering black children were unlawful as they were fostering children in
the care of the local authority and, therefore, were "a sector of the public".
Although the 1968 legislation outlawed public acts of discrimination it left
intact a private person's common law rights which allow them to discriminate
"to their heart's content". 3 8 Throughout the judgments emphasis is placed on
the extent to which the foster parents are in loco republicae. In so far as families
- often and traditionally thought of as archetypically private - can be
classified as public institutions, it seems both functionally and analytically
unsound to find that clubs cannot also possess the necessary attributes of
public identity; the impact of clubs on political morality and activity is no less
than that of families. In substantive terms, it is unclear why ordinary parents
should not be subject to the higher norms of public policy laid upon foster
parents. Furthermore, the legislation was amended in a somewhat ironic
manner; Parliament declared that clubs with over twenty-five members were
to be within the scope of the 1976 legislation and that foster parents were to be
outside it.
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Although the citing of the distinction between the public and private
spheres of social life can only be made in an arbitrary and ideological manner,
the distinction has served to insulate vast sectors of power from social reach
and censure. In the context of speech, the major beneficiaries of that state of
affairs have been media corporations. As the fourth estate of the realm, they
are not only considered to be beyond the scope of legitimate governmental
regulation, but are often accorded special privileges, as under the constitutions
of Canada and the United States of America. 40 The media is dominated by
huge corporations. The primary raison d'tre of the media is neither
disseminating news nor providing entertainment, but is the making of money
and the accumulation of capital. In the modern high-tech world in which
control over the channels of mass communication is a basis for broader
control and in which politics has become a visual spectacle more than anything
else, the abdication of such power to private interest is folly. If information is
the lifeblood of contempotary society, large corporations have the power to
regulate the pulse of the body politic in accordance with the dictates of
economic logic. As Liebling put it, the only person with freedom of the press is
someone who can afford to own one.
The judgments depend on and, at the same time, are undermined by the
public/private distinction. The courts' imagery is of a powerful public body
flexing its official muscles on a small group of private citizens - a minority view
being smothered by an intolerant majority. Yet, in Wheeler and Others v
Leicester City Council the substantive reality belies the formal rhetoric.
Leicester City Council sought to represent the black minority in its debate
with the white majority over racial issues. To translate the minority into
the mainstream, simply by virtue of that minority finding an official voice,
is to allow form to eclipse substance entirely. By obstructing attempts by
those promoting the disadvantaged people of Leicester to make an effect-
ive contribution to public debate and influence in the city stymied the
consolidation and further development of any sense of practice of civic
virtue.
To emphasise these arguments imagine that a large corporation like I.B.M.
was the landowner instead of Leicester City Council. Although the Race
Relations Act 1976 might prevent it from discriminating in the leasing of its
land on strictly racial grounds, I.B.M. is free to grant licenses to use its
property based on viewpoint discrimination. As Lord Simon put it, it can
discriminate to its heart's content. 4 1 This state of affairs puts paid to any
serious idea that free speech is a "much-prized and indispensable freedom". 4 2
Like most freedoms, it slips into the background when property owners enter
the picture. However, it might be argued, people are still free to speak; they
simply cannot expect property owners to share their views or to be indifferent
about them when it comes to bestowing favours, like using their property. This
argument is revealing. If this situation does not give rise to free speech issues, it
would not do so in the council context. This means that the issue will be one of
the state's property rights rather than the individual's freedom of speech. If
that is not the case and it is a free speech issue, then the outcome is that private
property rights always trump speech rights. Remembering that public
property is the only property that many Leicester citizens have or indirectly
control. Such reasoning reinforces further the privileges of the propertied.
Accordingly, the rhetoric of free speech is exaggerated and transparent. While
property owners are free to espouse their views, unpropertied citizens are
effectively left without a voice.0The only effective outlet is further constrained
by electoral preferences, including those of the rich, and by the judicial
enforcement of "reasonableness". 43
Finally, the identification of the club and its members as "private" is open
to doubt. It is surely more appropriate to recognise that it possesses no
intrinsic public or private identity, but that its status will vary depending on
the substantive context. Even within the limited discourse of the public/
private distinction, it is plausible to define a club as public; it is licensed
through the state, it uses public property and, therefore, possesses as much
analytical connection to the state as do foster parents. However, had the club
itself wanted to discriminate against persons wishing to use its facilities on the
basis of political opinion rather than race, the courts would not intervene. The
solution to this challenge is not to hide behind formal screens, but to address
the substantive issues of justice directly; there will be no easy and general
answers but only difficult and particular choices.
V
Contrary to conventional thinking, freedom of speech is not a principled
standard that can resolve recalcitrant issues of political and moral practice. As
so often in matters of speech, "the language of rights is at most a convenient
proxy for a heterogeneous collection of familiar moral reasons"; 44 it hides
more than it illuminates. Like any "contested concept", freedom of speech is
an intellectual terrain on which ideological forces battle for victory and
control. It is not a technical matter of legal principle, but an engaged struggle
over the kind of society we want to build and live in. An appreciation of this
leads to a demand for a new theory and practice of "free speech". It must go
beyond the liberal and democratic underpinnings of traditional writings and
lay a whole new foundation of understandings about language, personal
identity, group claims, and state action. This is a demanding but essential task.
Accordingly, the limited aim of this essay has been to discredit the moral
coherence and political integrity of the present practice and theory of free
speech and to expose its ideological foundations. Legal discourse is neither
determinate, dispositive, nor objective; it is a privileged and constitutive way
of society-making and, as such, is a formidable factor in attempts at social
change. By concentrating on Wheeler and Others v Leicester City Council, we
hope to have highlighted the particular values that legal thinking tends to
internalise and to have suggested alternative ways of framing and responding
to questions of free speech. While courts might feel obliged to trade in
certainties and feign an answer for everything, academics must resist such
expedient hubris and cultivate a tolerant humility which forever struggles "to
comprehend the world as a question".
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